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Abstract. Considering the importance of the 11th Sustainable Development Goal on sustainable 
cities and communities and the New Urban Agenda, it is imperative to address one of today’s 
crucial urban planning challenges, which concerns overexploitation, mismanagement, and 
quality issues related to public parks and state-owned public open space (POS). Selecting an 
appropriate methodological framework to formulate a solution to cope with the encountered 
challenges is necessary; however, finding a suitable one is difficult as there is a lack of research, 
particularly on the step-by-step development of a conceptual countermeasure (solution). Against 
this background, we adopted the revised design science research (DSR) framework and its 
procedural methodology to formulate a conceptual solution, represented as an artifact, within the 
institutional-social-ecological context of Sabah, Malaysia. The data obtained for the development 
and validation of the solution were secondary, based on a review via content analysis of prior 
studies. The proposed conceptual artifact (self-governing collective action) based on the root 
causes (i.e. property rights and transaction costs issues) from the ‘why’ analysis was then 
validated via the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework using its social-
ecological system (SES) criteria. The main contribution of this study is to showcase the 
application and relevancy of the DSR framework for urban and environmental planning research 
through a problem-solution analysis by demonstrating the process of how the artifact was 
systematically constructed, validated and standardised. It was found that the proposed conceptual 
solution can be considered valid and appropriate to address the local governance issues of POS.  
 
Keywords. Public open space, revised design science research, self-governing system, new 
institutional economics, conceptual solution. 
 
[Diterima: 15 Juni 2020; diperbaiki: 1 Agustus 2020; diterima dalam bentuk akhir: 27 Agustus 
2020] 
 
Abstrak. Mempertimbangkan pentingnya Tujuan Pembangunan Berkelanjutan ke-11 tentang 
Kota dan Komunitas yang Berkelanjutan dan Agenda Perkotaan Baru, penting untuk mengatasi 
salah satu tantangan perencanaan kota yang krusial saat ini terkait dengan permasalahan 
eksploitasi yang berlebihan, salah kelola, dan kualitas taman maupun ruang terbuka milik 
publik/negara (POS). Mencari kerangka metodologi yang tepat untuk mengatasi tantangan 
tersebut dirasakan perlu, tetapi menemukan yang cocok masih sulit karena kurangnya penelitian, 
terutama tahapan dan langkah mengembangkan konsep tindakan penanggulangan. Dengan latar 
belakang ini, dalam konteks kelembagaan-sosial-ekologis Sabah, Malaysia, kami mengadopsi 
 
1 Department of Urban and Regional Planning, Faculty of Built Environment and Surveying, Universiti 
Teknologi Malaysia. E-mail: gabriel.ling@utm.my 
2 Faculty of Built Environment and Surveying, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia. E-mail: pcleng2@utm.my 
3 Faculty of Built Environment and Surveying, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia. E-mail: noradila@utm.my 
4 Faculty of Engineering, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, E-mail: hwshin@utm.my 
16  Gabriel Hoh Teck Ling et al. 
 
 
kerangka kerja Penelitian Ilmu Desain (DSR) yang telah direvisi dan metodologi proseduralnya 
untuk merumuskan solusi konseptual yang direpresentasikan sebagai artefak. Data yang 
diperoleh untuk pengembangan dan validasi solusi adalah data sekunder, berdasarkan tinjauan 
melalui analisis konten dari studi sebelumnya. Artefak konseptual yang diusulkan (tindakan 
kolektif yang mengatur diri sendiri) berdasarkan akar penyebab (yaitu, masalah hak milik dan 
biaya transaksi) dari analisis 'mengapa'yang  kemudian divalidasi melalui kerangka Analisis dan 
Pengembangan Kelembagaan (IAD) dengan menggunakan kriteria social-ecological system 
(SES). Kontribusi utama studi ini adalah penerapan dan relevansi kerangka DSR dalam 
penelitian perencanaan kota dan lingkungan melalui analisis solusi masalah, dengan 
menunjukkan proses bagaimana artefak dibangun, divalidasi, dan distandarisasi secara 
sistematis. Akhirnya, artikel ini menunjukkan bahwa solusi konseptual yang diusulkan dianggap 
valid dan sesuai untuk mengatasi masalah tata kelola lokal POS. 
 
Kata kunci. Ruang terbuka publik, design science research, sistem tata-kelola mandiri, ekonomi 




Creating a liveable and sustainable environment for a better quality of life is challenging, as it 
involves multifaceted perspectives and undertakings. One of the means is via green open space 
provision; adequate and good quality spaces are proven to play a vital role in providing ecosystem 
services and benefits to communities. However, despite a raft of studies on the protection of public 
open space (hereinafter POS) – predominately from the fields of landscape/architectural design 
and spatial planning – and on how to provide sufficient attractive spaces (in terms of location, 
shape, size, design), such shared spaces (i.e. commons or common pool resources, CPR), mainly 
owned and managed by governments, are still subject to overexploitation (overconsumption), 
mismanagement and quality issues (Ling et al. 2019a). For example, due to government/state 
failures in some developing countries, issues of vandalism, unkempt, unaccessible and dangerous 
public spaces, and land conversion to private use (e.g. through the misuse of space) are common 
(Ling et al. 2019a). These negative externalities related to POS/commons, especially associated 
with governance and management issues in the residential neighbourhood context, have also been 
occurring within the study area, i.e. Sabah, Malaysia. As such, to address the institutional-related 
issues, which influence POS governance and management effectiveness as well as the POS 
consumption patterns of individuals, an interdisciplinary approach that covers the social-
ecological system is necessary. This would essentially look into institutional effects on human-
environmental behaviours. Therefore, a solution to address the above POS issues is required. Prior 
to solely and directly focusing on the solution itself, selecting a suitable methodology and design 
framework incorporating institutional-social-ecological considerations to formulate such a 
solution is a crucial concern, which should take precedence.  
 
Finding a suitable and relevant design framework is difficult, as there is limited research, 
especially on how to step-by-step (procedurally) and systematically construct and validate a 
conceptual countermeasure (solution) within the complex context of a social-ecological system. 
A conceptual solution formulation with qualitative descriptions was particularly emphasised in 
this study, rather than a detailed practical one with accurate quantitative measures. Given that, a 
question related to the contribution of this study was posed, i.e. does the conceptual solution 
offer any originality/novelty and values if there are existing practical solutions addressing 
them? The latter, which are not mainstream, can be confined to a specific, unique case study. 
A valid and effective conceptual solution helps to develop more advanced solutions and 
provide rationalisations for current practices/practical solutions (see Hanid, 2014). Besides, 






developing a detailed practical solution is time-consuming and costly, acknowledging the scarcity 
of resources in terms of technical know-how and the complex nature of the POS issues, which 
require prompt action. Therefore, a conceptual version is preferable, at this point in time, to serve 
as a preliminary model. It provides a pragmatic baseline for subsequent detailed design decisions 
and solutions and allows the concepts of the solution to be first evaluated via a cost-and-benefit 
analysis.  
 
Based on a brief literature search, design frameworks such as Roadway’s practical solution 
concept (Stamatiadis et al. 2010), the practical problem-solving methodology of Toyota (Liker, 
2004), constructive research (Lukka, 2003), and design science research (DSR) (Vaishnavi and 
Kuechler, 2007) have been adopted in developing solutions to remedy emergent issues. 
However, most of them are more about designing practical solutions, which may not be relevant 
to this study. As for constructive research, although it has much resemblance (as a good 
validation) to DSR, the former is not as robust and comprehensive as the revised version of DSR 
(Hanid, 2014). Hence, the revised DSR was chosen as sole methodological framework with the 
following rationale. DSR, which emphasises practical problem-based solutions, also involves 
solution-based knowledge and concepts, in which the outcome of a phenomenon from systematic 
reasoning (via prediction and explanation) can be useful for formulating solutions to address 
complex practical problems (see Lukka, 2003 on theory building). Similarly, related to the theory-
building aspect, Carstensen and Bernhard (2019) posited that DSR is “…a qualitative research 
approach… it simultaneously generates knowledge about the method used to design an artifact 
and the design or the artifact itself.” 
 
Furthermore, Hevner (2007) asserts that the DSR framework, incorporating multiple methods and 
knowledge bases, can potentially address existing real problems in a more innovative manner, 
which is in line with this study’s intention. Besides, since DSR is popular in engineering and 
architecture, focusing on creation, and to a certain extent in accounting information systems 
(Geerts, 2011) and education engineering research (Carstensen and Bernhard, 2019) it is found 
that there is a DSR application gap in the urban and environmental planning fields. Thus, 
exploration of DSR is worth to be undertaken, particularly in this predominantly qualitative study 
so that it may offer a different approach towards finding solutions or model formulation in the 
planning field, which also methodologically adds value to the DSR framework in terms of its 
application validity and flexibility. Moreover, DSR is very similar to the long-established and 
renowned constructive research approach and Toyota’s practical problem solving model, which 
can serve as a basis for the former (Hanid, 2014). And lastly, various DSR models for different 
research areas (e.g. management and economics) (see Peffers et al. 2007; Hevner, 2007) have 
been published in highly prestigious journals. 
 
Against this background, this paper explores the applicability and relevancy of the revised DSR 
framework in developing a solution in the context of environmental planning. More precisely, it 
demonstrates how the revised DSR can be employed in a local context encompassing institutional-
social-POS dimensions. This study focused on existing issues of neighbourhood POSs that are 
governed by the local property system, primarily referencing and sourcing from prior studies’ 
empirical data and findings. This means that we succinctly describe the key findings and relevant 
data that are required for identification of the problems and root causes as well as for solution 
development and validation, instead of explaining the methodology in detail, e.g. covering what 
factors and variables are involved and how they were obtained. The study’s methodological 
approach is consistent with the reporting method by Robson et al. (2008) (see also Ling and Leng, 
2018). 
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The rest of this paper presents the folllowing: (i) a methodology covering the study area against 
the background of its POS property rights system as well as the DSR framework, focusing on the 
steps and processes involved in the analysis of problems and root causes, and solution design, 
construction and validation; (ii) results and discussion based on the DSR process; and finally (v) 
the conclusion, including a summary of the key findings, the research’s significance and policy 




Study Area  
 
Focusing on institutional-commons (POS) issues, the Kota Kinabalu district and the Penampang 
district of Sabah state, Malaysia, with a heterogeneous property rights structure governing country 
lease (CL) and native title (NT) POS use and management (Ling et al. 2019b), were chosen as the 
areas of research. Figure 1 shows the two study areas’ geographical locations and territorial 
coverage and boundaries. Based on the residential land use data for 2014, there were 
approximately 350 CL POS and 22 NT POS in Kota Kinabalu and Penampang (Ling et al. 2019b). 
These CL and NT spaces are governed and managed by the city hall of Kota Kinabalu and the 
district council of Penampang, respectively. Rather than relying only on the capital city-level 
district, i.e. Kota Kinabalu, Penampang was selected concurrently in this study to offer a more 
holistic view of how the local property rights system results in POS governance and management 
issues. Besides, due to the inadequate sample size of NT POS from Kota Kinabalu, the NT POS 
data samples and related data were primarily elicited from relevant private and public 
organisations of the Penampang district. 
 
 
Figure 1. Kota Kinabalu and Penampang districts of Sabah, Malaysia as study areas  
(Ling et al. 2019b). 
 
Property rights system governing local CL POS and NT POS  
 
Public environmental goods (in this case POS) are provisioned through the land development 
process, more precisely land subdivision or partition. Sections 25(2)(q), 28D, and the Third 
Schedule of Part 4 (1) of the Town and Country Planning Ordinance Cap 141 state that when land 
subdivision is undertaken at least 10% of the land acreage should be reserved for open space for 
public purposes. The subdivision process and related procedures related to the surrender of land 
are also based on the Sabah Land Ordinance (SLO) Cap 68, specifically Sections 38 and 40. 






Rather than covering the general land subdivision of various types of land use, this study is set 
within the context of landed, open and unexclusive residential and housing property. More 
specifically, we looked at how the current formal and legal institutions (law, land policies and 
practice) influence the system of POS provision, management, and consumption in terms of its 
property rights. There are two categories of land for alienation and leasing purposes, namely 
Country Land and Native Land. For the Country Land subdivision, according to Section 48 of the 
SLO, a title deed/leasehold with a lease not exceeding 99 years will be granted to (CL) POS, 
whereas for native title (NT) POS, no title deed issuance is involved. 
 
The ownership of NT POS can only be held by local natives, pursuant to the SLO under Sections 
17 and 64, and following the same ordinance under Section 66, highlighting the permanency and 
security of NT rights, its customary tenure is in perpetuity (Ling et al. 2019b). Moreover, 
according to Sections 4 and 5, NT POS, which is deemed state land governed by the state 
government, serves a public purpose. In addition to the above provisions of the primary land and 
planning laws, a local judicial decision/case law in line with Section 88 of the SLO on the 
importance of land registration for validity, emphasises the concept of bare trusteeship of the 
Modified Torrens System. To better understand POS management and consumption, Sections 
38(1), 49(1)(53), and 49A of the Local Government Ordinance 1961, statutory local plans, 
development and landscape plans, the Housing Development Enactment 1978, and the offer letter 
were also reviewed (see more in Ling et al. 2019b).  
 
Table 1. The property rights system of CL POS and NT POS. 
* Only certain neighbourhood communities may adopt the co-management regime, on a voluntary basis. 
** Subdividers/owners will become bare trustees, i.e. a person who is deprived of his/her equitable management rights 
on POS, after satisfying the owner’s covenant in terms of temporary and transitional (18-month) POS maintenance 
duty. The bare trustee still owns a non-active duty, i.e. to undertake the registration of POS title conveyance, where the 
local government ultimately becomes the legal owner of the POS. 
 
The above land titling practice concerning local POS (i.e. titled CL POS and untitled NT POS) is 
considered to be consistent with the mixed institutions concept, which means that a self-enforced 
(de facto convention)  and  a formal-but-not-necessarily-legal system co-exist (see Ling et al. 
2019b). Based on the above institutions, both CL POS and NT POS have their specific rules and 
conditions pertaining to ownership, management, access, exclusion, and consumption rights. 
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However, more complex ones are imposed on the former. Table 1 shows the diversity and 
heterogeneity of the property rights distribution of local CL POS and NT POS. For the untitled 
NT POS system, since they are surrendered to the state government, the POS is de jure deemed 
state or government property, where management rights and duties (i.e. POS maintenance) should 
in principle and formally be vested in the local government (Ling et al. 2016). Nevertheless, due 
to the issue of nonvested management rights by the state, the local government does not own and 
may not effectively exercise any duties regarding the legal management of NT POS. Therefore, 
NT POS is subject to an open-access resource regime (i.e. no man’s land); such spaces are likely 
to be ungoverned, unmanaged, and exploited/degraded (see Ling et al. 2019b). This has led to a 
reality that the local government, similar to other users, only owns active use and access rights. 
 
As for the governance of CL POS, such titled POS involves a 3-phase process. In the 1st phase, 
since the POS title is yet to be issued by the land office it involves a not yet handed over POS 
site5 and a not transferred POS title deed, where the legal and equitable private developer/owner 
is liable to fulfilling the owner covenants. The owner covenants entail that the owners/private 
subdividers are required to carry out the POS management duties effectively to the satisfaction of 
the local government, stipulated and agreed in the letter of offer prior to the approval of 
subdivision (Ling et al., 2019b). Next, the interim or intermediate phase involves both handed 
over POS and not yet transferred POS. Only after the satisfaction of the owner covenants, handing 
over of the POS and a registrable memorandum of transfer to the local government are allowable; 
implicitly, the owner (title holder), becoming a bare trustee, formally relinquishes his/her active 
POS ownership and management rights and duties to the new equitable owner, namely the local 
authority. That said, the bare trustee, who is the titleholder, is still a legitimate owner because the 
transfer of the POS title deed is yet to be undertaken or effectuated (registered). Furthermore, in 
this stage, some residential neighbourhoods’ communities and residents are endowed with 
management rights by the local government, where they can be involved and participate in the 
management task together with the local authority (i.e. co-management). Lastly, as for the 3rd 
(final) phase, once the handed over POS title deed has been issued and the transfer of the POS 
title is executed, the equitable local government will be the formal, de jure owner and manager of 
the POS (with active claimant rights), where the same rules imposed on the private owner during 
the 1st phase of the CL POS process are applied to the authority (Ling et al. 2016). For example, 
alienation or transfer of POS (change of ownership) is not allowed, as the local government will 
be the ultimate manager/steward of the POS. Also, the CL POS must remain shared, unexclusive 
and open to the public, and in terms of POS use and function, no land conversion and development 
are permissible for both CL POS and NT POS.  
 
The goal of the above discussion is to provide an understanding of the heterogeneity/diversity of 
local institutional property rights and governance features for CL POS and NT POS, which are 
used as data input, feeding into the following SES-based DSR procedural framework. 
Specifically, the current institutions and property rights, as exogenous variables, are required in 






5 A mechanism ensuring continued, efficient POS maintenance and management by subdividers due to the 
long and time-consuming process of title issuance and transfer, i.e. if the POS title is still to be issued and 
transferred but the 18-month owner’s covenants have been fulfilled, the handing over of the site should be 
executed while awaiting the title deed issuance. In this case, since the covenant in terms of the time period 
of 18 months and maintenance of POS is yet to be fulfilled, POS site handing over is not allowed. 






A Revised DSR Methodology 
 
Generally speaking, DSR covers the following three steps: (i) establishing awareness of critical 
issues or problems; (ii) design science (countermeasure) development and evaluation; and (iii) 
theory building, despite the differences in terms of the elements involved in each step (see more 
in Ling, 2017). For instance, in March and Smith’s (1995) idiosyncratic DSR process, there is no 
problem identification and Peffers et al. (2007) have argued that the sequence of steps of the DSR 
process is flexible. In this study, building on the conventional and general DSR process, the 
revised version was adopted (see Vaishnavi and Kuechler, 2007; Hevner, 2007) (see Figure 3 
below). The reasons are that the former (i.e. general DSR) faced several criticisms related to the 
unclearness of how the root causes of a problem are identified, while the second one is about the 
derivation or origination of the solution (artifact), i.e. a series of questions is posed: how is a 
solution constructed? More precisely, is developing the solution based on any concept or theory? 
And next, how is the concept/theory used formulated towards the artifact (solution) (see Hanid, 
2014). More specifically, Figure 2 which shows the three design cycles –the relevance cycle 
(problem and root cause identification), the design cycle (countermeasure formulation), and the 
rigor cycle (knowledge bases: theories and concepts) – are only found and embedded in the 




Figure 2. Design science research cycles (Hevner, 2007). 
 
Similar to the general DSR, the first stage of the revised DSR focuses on the awareness and 
establishment of practical problems based on anomalies. Subsequently, the focus is on the root-
cause examination. The primary idea is that inductive and deductive (abductive) reasoning and a 
multi-tier ‘why’ analysis (an enquiry technique engaging in a series of questions on why the 
problem occurred) are required to discover the real, in-depth and systemic root causes of the 
problems, so that a valid countermeasure can be developed to respond effectively (see causal 
effect theory) (Hanid, 2014; see also Sondalini, 2009 Toyota’s 5-level ‘why’ analysis). As 
Liker (2004) argued: “identifying ‘root cause’ rather than ‘source’; the Root Cause lies 
hidden beyond the source”. There are three types of causes in determining the root causes 
(Hanid, 2014): (a) physical causes; (b) human causes; and (c) organisational causes involving 
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a system, process, or policy. However, only the organisational factors were primarily 
emphasised in this study, as they are the inherent parts of the institutional-social-ecological 
(physical) system. More specifically, due to issues with the local property right system it 
influences social behaviours, which therefore impact the physical/ecological system (i.e. 
POS). Next, a conceptual solution (artifact) design and development was carried out through: 
(i) deduction (theories and concepts) and induction (evidence); and (ii) observation of 
practical, initial ideas and solutions forwarded by empirical subjects. Last but not least, the 
solution requires validation and standardisation. The conceptual solution needs to undergo 
validation in terms of the feasibility/viability of the development of the solution as well as 
potentiality and effectiveness in ameliorating the problems (against the set objective of the 
artifacts). The validated solution will be standardised against and compared with existing 
theoretical or methodological knowledge bases to verify whether the validated conceptual 




Figure 3. The revised DSR framework (Vaishnavi and Kuechler, 2007; Hevner, 2007). 
 
Methods in 3-Step DSR 
 
As highlighted earlier, this study’s data elicitation process solely involved secondary data and an 
extensive literature review of both theoretical and empirical works. Next, a qualitative content 
analysis was performed in which several deductive themes (based on a priori/theoretical concepts) 
for each stage of DSR were identified. The social-ecological impacts of the property rights system 
(including collective action/common property) via transaction costs and incentive distribution, 
and social behavioural issues of POS management and consumption that act as mediating 
factors, were analysed based on the seminal theoretical works of Coase (1960), North (1990), 
Hanna et al. (1996), Barzel (1997), Ostrom (1990), Hardin (1968), Colding et al. (2013), and 
Webster (2007).  Apart from that, a number of empirical works were consulted, particularly on 
Sabah, by Ling et al. (2016), Ling (2017), Ling and Leng (2018), Ling (2019), Ling et al. (2019a) 
and Ling et al. (2019b). Table 2 shows a summary, describing the literature, data collection and 
analysis sources, areas of concerns, and deductive themes involved in each step of DSR. 
 
 






Table 2. A methodological summary of the 3-step DSR framework. 
 
3-Step DSR Literature Sources and Concepts 
Data Collection & 
Data Analysis Areas of Concerns Themes Established 
1st stage: 
Problem and root 
cause 
identification 
Ling (2017), Ling’s et al. 
(2016) statistical associations 
between property rights issues 
and POS quality, Ling’s et al. 
(2019b) mixed-method 
approach studying the effects 
of property rights tragedies on 
POS governance and quality, 
Foster (2011), Foster and 
Laione (2016), Webster and 
Lai (2003), Musole (2009) on 










Emphasising Sabah public open 
space quality issues and 
institutional factors (property 
right system), especially on 
how the property right system 
leads to POS governance, 
consumption, and management 
issues. The review is about the 
social POS impacts of Sabah’s 
diverse property rights system, 
or the interrelationships 
between institutional property-
rights and local POS 
governance (quality issues) 
Property right issues: 
Emergence of maladaptive 
rights, attenuated rights, 






Common dilemmas and 
negative externalities: POS 
overexploitation/ tragedy of the 
commons, shirking 
(underinvestment), free riding, 






Ling (2019) on local 
application of Ostrom’s design 
principles in POS governance, 
Van Laerhoven (2010) on 
successful collective action 
design principles (see also 
Ostrom, 2011), Webster and 
Lai (2003) on property rights 
realignment, Ostrom (1990) 
on collective action design 
principles, Buchanan (1965) 
on club goods, Carmona 
(2008) advantages of 
community approach on 





Realignment of the state 
property regime (state-owned 
POS) to a self-organising 
collective action, which is a 
common-property based regime 
that is believed to result in 
better POS governance and 
quality 
A self-governing system, 
Ostrom’s eight design principles 
and other successful 
institutional-social-ecological 
attributes for collective action, 
POS management via a 
community,  Nelson’s (2004) 
procedural homeowners 
association  (HOA) formation, 
Williamson’s (1993) ex-post 
opportunism contractual and 
transaction costs governance, 
subsidiarity (polycentricity) 






of the solution 
Ling and Leng (2018), 
Ostrom’s (1990) design 
principles and Institutional 
Analysis and Development 
(IAD) framework, Ling’s 
(2017) mixed-method study on 
the acceptability/willingness 
of stakeholders in adopting the 
collective action mechanism, 
review of the existing local 










To explore whether or not the 
conceptual common property 
regime as a solution (artifact) is 
valid (successful) to address the 
POS governance and quality 
issues and is pragmatic, 
feasible (implementability and 
acceptability) in the local POS 
context 
High resemblance/similarity 
with Ostrom’s design principles 
and other collective-action 
enabling factors entails there is 
a higher likelihood (feasibility) 
to adopt a collective action 
approach for POS governance as 





Findings and Discussions 
 
Problems (Symptoms) and Root Causes 
 
This section summarises the key practical or real problems of the social dilemmas related to CL 
POS and NT POS triggered by institutional (property-rights structure) issues. The findings are 
tabulated in a three-column table (Table 3): interrelated institutional root causes, key issues, 
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Table 3. Key issues, symptoms, and negative effects of POS. 
 
Grasping the Entire Problem Situation and Root Causes of POS 
Key Issues Anomalies (Symptoms) Grasping the Problems (Negative Effects) 




Proper consumption is expected, but signs of 
overharvesting (vandalism, littering, strangers 
loitering, squatting, overcrowding) are detected; 
POS is no used longer as POS (other purposes) 
The POS facilities are broken, dirty, 
unsafe, dissatisfaction or conflict, 
inaccessible, other negative 
externalities (e.g.,pollution) 
Shirking 
Management, maintenance or other tasks should be 
executed; however, there are signs of lack of 
maintenance, insufficient resources  
(underinvestment/under-maintenance), unenforced 
duties, e.g. no monitoring, transfer or handing over 
of title is evident 
The POS facilities and amenities look 
old, vandalised, broken, unattractive, 
dirty, wear and tear, poor landscaping 
(bushes, overgrown grass) 
Free-riding 
It is expected a fair system is provided in which the 
‘no free lunch’ concept is employed, i.e. it needs 
payment or something in return for the 
consumption of POS (no free-riding is intended). 
However, some users who are not from the locality 
have used the POS, such as squatters or users from 
other neighbourhoods (outsiders), and yet no de 
jure exclusion (blocking) is allowed 
If everyone/anyone can access the 
space then overcrowded/congested 
space may exist, poor POS quality and 
social conflict exist, especially due to 
outsiders who may contribute to POS 
overconsumption (security, unfairness, 
and dissatisfaction issues) 
Moral hazard 
Even though the POS is not owned and managed 
by public users as the government or private 
supplier de jure hold these rights, it is still expected 
the users can courteously use it and can protect it 
since they are the regular and potential local users, 
but some users are behaving irresponsibly towards 
POS consumption, e.g. they may use the space 
recklessly or overuse it 
Overexploitation of space (see the 
above examples of overexploitation) 
may also lead to other dilemmas, e.g. 
free-riding and shirking and hence poor 
quality of POS. Selfish and 
uncooperative behaviour among users 
is inculcated as well 
Disuse  
Optimal use of space is expected (no overuse or 
underused/unused space). However, it can be seen 
that no one is using and managing the current POS 
anymore (no man’s land), totally neglected/ 
abandoned, idle (desolate), vacant and 
under/undeveloped 
Poor quality of POS occurs; the POS 
becomes unkempt, i.e. surrounded by 
thick and overgrown bushes, grass and 
consequently the space is inaccessible 
and not functional 




The public space is open for the public, i.e. no 
exclusion is allowed but alas, some POS seem to be 
excluded for private use by some individuals 
The POS no longer serves as public 
space, worse still: the POS is overused 
or converted to other private uses (poor 
quality exists) 




The current property rights are expected to be 
adaptively and suitably assigned, i.e. rights and 
duties are easily enforced, but it appears that the 
current rights distribution is not sustainable and 
efficient. 
Inefficient, unsuitable, and 
unsustainable management 
(monitoring, maintenance), 
consumption and other unenforced 
rights and duties on POS; hence, 




Ideally, clear and certain rights are expected but in 
a practical sense, it is not possible to have complete 
rights, i.e. specifying every single right; especially 
the complex ones are not possible as the rights will 
always have ambiguity/gaps (due to high 
transaction costs).  However, it is possible to 
minimise the ex-post opportunism via other means.  
This unclearness of how and when to 
use, when to manage the POS leads to 
both issues of consumption and 
management of POS, which, hence, 
leads to poor quality of the POS 
(negative externalities) like overuse, 
shirking, and disused 






Grasping the Entire Problem Situation and Root Causes of POS 





on POS are 
weakened) 
Attenuated (weakened) rights are seen as a double-
edged sword; the good side is expected to outweigh 
the other side. However, it turns out that the 
negative sides (less profiteering terms) evidentially 
emerge (less return due to reduced benefits), which 
leads to opportunistic private suppliers of POS 
governance and management 
This weakened right leads to 
mismanagement and underinvestment 
of the POS, resulting in a poor quality 
of the POS (negative externalities) like 
overuse and misuse. 
De facto 
(perception) rights 
on CL POS title 
deed and ancestral 
land on NT POS 
Legally, title deed possession does not necessarily 
mean exclusive ownership with indefeasibly un-
attenuated rights; instead, there is a bare trustee of 
the POS, especially after the duties have been 
performed. Some owners perceive that by retaining 
the title, it is exclusive and secured ownership. This 
also applies to NT POS; some owners who live 
nearby the POS may perceive that they still own 
such state POS  
Unnecessary externalities emergence, 
e.g. de facto exclusion, 
overconsumption, other unexecuted or 
unenforced duties (e.g. investment, 




Figure 4. Interrelationships between property rights issues (root causes) and POS dilemmas 
(Adapted from Ling et al. 2019b). 
 
This study discovered four key interrelated property rights tragedies under the state-private 
property rights regime, i.e. rights attenuation, incomplete rights, maladaptation of rights, and 
insecure and self-enforced rights. From an institutional lens, the property rights issues 
rudimentarily associated with high transaction costs and perverse incentives are deemed to be the 
root cause because they incentivise individuals’ self-interest and opportunistic behaviour, thus 
resulting in the above commons dilemmas, namely overexploitation, free riding and shirking. The 
outcomes also suggest that the local property rights tragedies and POS dilemmas caused or are 
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associated with other rights issues and commons dilemmas, and such interrelationships lead to a 
property-rights-POS dilemmas nexus. For example, the overexploitation of POS is due to shirking 
(i.e. a POS dilemma) as well as incomplete and attenuated property rights. See Figure 4 for the 
expanded version (i.e. more details of codes) of interrelationships between property rights issues 
and POS dilemmas as well as the simplified version of the right-dilemmas nexus with two 
abstraction levels in Figure 5. The current local institutional arrangement is indeed adversarial as 
it externalises POS common dilemmas; thus, an institutional change (as a solution) via an efficient 
adaptation or re-distribution of property-rights over such state-owned public-domain POSs is 




Figure 5. Simplified nexus illustrating property rights issues (root causes) and POS dilemma 
linkages (Adapted from Ling et al. 2019b). 
 
Conceptual Solution: Ostrom’s Eight Design Principles in Local POS governance 
 
Based on the above inferences of POS dilemmas, issues and institutional root causes, it is 
necessary to propose the adaptive realignment (reallocation) of the property rights regime from 
state property to common property via Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom’s eight design principles in 
governing and managing common resources (or CPR) as the solution (Ostrom, 1990). More 
precisely, Ostrom’s self-governing collective action system offers the following features, 
advocating the idea of few perverse incentives and low enforcement costs to help disincentivise 
opportunistic, defective behaviours in POS management and consumption: (i)  more effective 
governance and enforcement of operational duties (e.g. maintenance) by better positioned 
stakeholders (see the subsidiarity principle) to address the issue of a maladaptive property regime; 
(ii) providing an incentive system as a motivator so that the POS managers will be more willing 
to enforce their management rights and impose sanctions on violators (both users and managers), 
i.e. shirkers and overusers, to address both insecure and attenuated rights issues; (iii) a more 
comprehensive contract (as comprehensive as possible, as these are better than simple and general 






ones) to curb the issue of incomplete rights; (iv) an exclusionary right should be assigned to the 
community, i.e. the POS still remains public but for members only, e.g. via a payment system (i.e. 
it becomes club good POS instead of CPR-based POS) (see Buchanan (1965) on the efficiency of 
club goods in effectively governing resource overconsumption or the free-rider issue via an 
exclusionary mechanism); and lastly (v) the government recognises the community co-
management right and act as a monitor, providing assistance to the community; a contract between 
managers, users and the government is agreed, which can help address the insecure rights and 
maladaptive allocation (high enforcement costs) of the state regime.  
 
The following is to illuminate how the modified common property-based eight principles of 
Ostrom with the above features can be conceptually adapted and realised in Sabah’s current CL 
POS and NT POS governance. 
1st principle: well-defined rights and POS boundaries  
 
The rights to use resource units from CPR-based POS must be clearly specified and allocated, as 
must be the boundaries of the POS itself. Both titled CL POS and untitled NT POS have well 
defined physical boundaries and spatial attributes; the spaces are immovable and tangible, in 
which category of use, location, size/area, and shape are predetermined during land subdivision. 
Satisfying the homeownership association institution’s procedural requirements by Nelson 
(2004), with the elements of the coerciveness of such institution formation (Chen and Webster, 
2006), all residents living within the community neighbourhood with POS are obliged to become 
members who have access and consumption rights on POS. Some of them who are elected or 
 
Table 4. Common-property rights governing CL POS and NT POS. 
 
Property-Rights Structure Titled CL and NT POS 
Land ownership Communal regime (gazetted) 
Management regime 
(Hybrid/mixed institutions) 
Common property + state property: 
committee of residents + state (local authority) 
(should be vested in)* 
Positions: 
Bundle of rights: 
Proprietors 




Exclusion Yes (on outsiders or violators: including members) 
Alienation Yes** 
Public access and withdrawal rights 
Yes if membership/permission is granted 
(as this is now public-closed access) 
(see Buchanan’s 1965 club goods) 
* Local governments provide assistance in terms of sanctioning, monitoring, conflict 
resolutions & other maintenance/management operations. Such interventions are essential to 
reduce the transaction costs. 
** Transfer and rent/lease of accessory/auxiliary resource/property (i.e. POS) is permitted so 
long as the main dwelling unit is transferred to another party. Within the title deed, a restriction 
should be imposed that such a common resource cannot be used for any collateral purposes. 
 
voted as committee members are to take up the rights and duties of governing and managing 
(including monitoring) the POS. In terms of communal property rights, the POS ownership regime 
should be held by the community, so that the proprietors (members) have the incentive and 
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interest to invest in, govern and manage the resource (see the rights attenuation theory). A hybrid 
management regime is proposed: co-management and assistance rendered by a government are 
essential to ensure more efficient POS governance. As for the POS exclusion of free riders or 
shirkers/violators, such an exclusionary right promotes and incentivises the willingness of the 
community for better resource investment and protection. It is not just a legal enclosure right 
conferred upon the community. Rather, more physical signs of exclusion involving verbal 
exclusion are crucial to provide an explicit notification to others on such exclusivity, e.g. 
barricading the compound of POS and posting a signboard. In sum, Table 4 illustrates the self-
organising common property system for CL POS and NT POS governance. 
2nd principle: congruity of operational rules with local conditions, and costs and benefits should 
be proportionate  
 
POS operational rules specifying the access and consumption time (i.e. when), place (i.e. where), 
and quantity of resource units (i.e. how long can the POS be occupied) should correspond to local 
social-ecological conditions. This is a means to specify more complete rights for users, curbing 
potential opportunistic behaviours and commons dilemmas due to uncertainties of duties and 
rights. Devising appropriate and equitable POS operational rules is essential, and POS 
management costs (investment) and consumption benefits (enjoyment) must be somewhat 
proportionate. The latter must at least be more significant by reasonably exceeding the former so 
it incentivises individuals to appreciate and invest in the POS. However, if the benefits 
substantially transcend the costs, this may connote that overexploitation or overuse of POS by 
certain users, or the rules in use, are not equitable because some individuals’ interests are being 
favoured while others’ are being infringed. 
3rd principle: collective rules arrangement 
 
A community comprising both committee members and resident members can participate in 
modifying and devising the operational rules about its management and consumption of the POS, 
particularly in a changing social-ecological environment, as community and POS characteristics 
may vary over time. Via periodical community meetings, any members who have interests within 
the neighbourhood can voice their ideas, suggestions, preferences and dissatisfaction about the 
issues of the existing operational rules of access, consumption, exclusion, management and 
alienation of the POS so that necessary improvements and adjustments can be carried out to 
address specific issues of the rules in use. Consensus building via effective communication 
between the committee and the members is crucial in devising and modifying the rules. 
4th principle: monitoring 
 
Effective monitoring of (i) POS users (residents or non-residents with permission to use) by 
ensuring they will not behave opportunistically or selfishly to overuse/vandalise the space; (ii) 
managers (committee members) managing and maintaining POS so that they may not shirk their 
management duties; and (iii) POS condition and quality. The monitoring task can be executed 
voluntarily (with existing POS non-pecuniary benefits) or mandatorily (with a sanction and 
incentive system) or local government assistance. Routine policing activities involving residents 
who live nearby the POS with the assistance of the local government and informal-mutual 
surveillance via resident cooperation are vital, not only to reduce the costs of monitoring 
compared to hiring a private guard for each neighbourhood, ultimately to ensure the good 
condition and quality of the POS. Pecuniary incentives, e.g. management fee reduction or 






payment, can be provided to the residents involved in order to incentivise and sustain their 
positive behaviour in running the monitoring duties.  
5th principle: graduated sanctions/penalties 
 
Based on the types and severity of violations, anyone/users violating the POS operational rules 
(e.g. POS overexploitation, free riding and duty shirking) are liable to graduated 
sanctions/penalties. The sanctions must be carried out impartially and are based on a good or 
reasonable basis; issues of dissatisfaction and complaints due to unfair treatment/sanctions should 
not occur. For example, a first-time rule breaker causing mild vandalism at the POS either 
accidentally or purposely should lightly be fined compared to more severe cases done by the same 
individual, where they need to face heavier sanctions. Penalties imposed can vary (either in a 
pecuniary or non-pecuniary form), including increased management fee, the involvement of 
violators in maintenance tasks within a specified time frame, and temporary banning of POS use. 
Local governments can intervene in the local sanctioning process, in case more severe violations 
transcend the community level. At times, coercive punishment can ensure better cooperation 
among community members. 
6th Principle: conflict resolution mechanism 
 
Both the POS community and users should have access to a low-cost platform to resolve conflicts. 
Conflicts or disagreements over certain POS issues between users or members are sometimes 
inevitable; however, they should be detected early on and efficiently resolved via a possible range 
of options. This is to avoid unnecessary transaction costs, which may contribute to complicated 
and more significant unsolvable issues. Additionally, if conflicts are efficiently addressed, it 
reduces cooperation costs and misunderstanding among the stakeholders (users and committees) 
and thus social capital (e.g. trust and mutuality) is promoted. Aside from litigation, which is a 
costly and time-consuming avenue and hence less preferable, there are various informal means 
and low-cost conflict management platforms, such as negotiation, mediation, public hearings and 
forums, that can be used to resolve local conflicts. Local government assistance can be necessary 
if there are more severe conflicts and issues that are not resolvable at the local level. 
7th principle: recognition of rights to self-governing and organising  
 
The communal rights to devise their self-organising institutions/rules in governing POS are not 
disputed by external governmental authorities or formal and legal institutions, such as land and 
planning laws. Having the formal government recognition and endorsement via legal land title 
registration of POS (see the 1st principle) provides secure tenure of the common property regime. 
Such assurance and certainty incentivise the members to manage, protect and invest in the POS. 
This principle opens up the opportunity for a co-management regime (co-existence of top-down 
and bottom-up approaches) comprising both the community and the government, as adopted in 
the 4th, 5th, and 6th principles above. As described, assistance and empowerment of governments 
minimise transaction costs, i.e. it helps facilitate the community’s operational and managerial 
activities and decision-making. 
8th principle: polycentricity and subsidiarity 
 
For a larger, complex social-ecological system (e.g. there are many POSs in a district), polycentric 
(multiple centres) governance with all of the above design principles is required. Similar to the 
concept of subsidiarity or devolution/nesting (see the concept of vertical linkages), it is essential 
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to delegate/coordinate power to the most local level by establishing a community-level centre as 
well as to the relevant group, which has a stronger position to govern and manage the POS 
(Webster and Lai, 2003). Relying only on a single, centralised unit/government will have a severe 
impact, because operational and management costs will be very high. Despite differences in terms 
of social-POS characteristics of neighbourhoods, horizontal linkages, i.e. collaboration and 
communication between the same level/hierarchy of centres satisfying the principles of 
polycentricity is encouraged. Thus, information and experience-sharing is promoted between 
different neighbourhoods, which contributes to improving the existing collective operational 
tasks. Also, government involvement is required in the broader social-ecological context, where 
it directly deals with the highest committee level. 
 
Validation and Standardisation of Self-Organising Collective Action for Local POS 
 
Next, after the phase of development of the artifact, it is vital to identify whether the proposed 
self-organising solution is valid and effective to address the current issues with state-owned POSs 
and is institutionally and operationally feasible. Hence, validation of the developed solution was 
executed based on the IAD framework and local stakeholders’ (residents, local governments, and 
land officers) views. This is crucial to determine the adaptation and modification likelihood of 
the current local SES to the collective action system; questions of how many complex attributes 
of the existing local SES resemble the DPs or how many DPs are present in the local SES, and to 
what extent, have been addressed. High similarity and a large number of DPs means lower 
transaction costs (adaptation and modification costs) and therefore leads to potential and feasible 
institutional property regime reallocation to self-organising collective action and vice versa (see 
Ostrom, 2011). The IAD framework emphasising governance (institutional), social and ecological 
components has a total of 21 SES sub-attributes. Based on a coding system, there are five options 
used to express the degree of existence of DPs, namely Present (P), Mostly Present (MP), 
Sometimes Present (P), Rarely Present (RP), and Absent (A). Table 5 presents the result of local 
NT POS and CL POS attributes, benchmarked and assessed with the modified collective action 
DPs that serve as ideal, standard conditions. In general, based on the assessments cutting across 
the three aspects of SES, relative to NT POS scoring  0 (P), 3 (MP), 6 (SP), 4 (RP), and 8 (A), CL 
POS, with 1 (P), 12 (SP), 3 (MP), and 5 (RP), and 0 (A) (see more details in Table 5) is more 
likely or potentially feasible to be shifted or realigned to a common-property self-organising 
regime. This is because the transaction costs of adaptation and modification for CL SES are not 
very high compared to NT SES deviating much from the collective action DPs. 
 
The IAD-validated results below suggesting the institutional and operational feasibility of local 
POSs to adapt collective action were triangulated using the pilot survey of multi-stakeholders. It 
can be seen that over 95% of respondents showed an interest and intention to shift from the current 
adversarial centralised state-owned POS regime to a self-organising regime. The same 
respondents believed that such a self-organising system for POS provides better governance and 
quality of CPR-based POS after experiencing the advantages of communal management in other 
common/shared resources contexts, e.g. parks, lifts, swimming pools in closed access apartments 
or gated and guarded residential property. The above high consensus in terms of interest and 
common goals can be associated with Olson’s (1965) concept of homogeneity of a community, 












Table 5. Validation of the SES attributes of local NT POS and CL POS with the modified DPs. 
 
IAD-based SES Attributes CL POS NT POS 
Successful Collective 
Action DPs  
(as a Standard) 
Community Attributes 
i)  Small number of actors or size of 




(SP)  (P) 





(MP)  (P) 




POS with the head of 
villages, referred to as 
(Ketua Kampong) 
(ancestral land) (SP) 
 (P) 
iv)  Homogeneity (norms, belief, 
cultural, interest, goal, values, 





than CL POS (SP) 
 (P) 
v)  Trust and reciprocity (DP 2) Unlikely (RP) Occasionally (RP)  (P) 
vi)  Local management knowledge and 
experience (DP 2) 
With co-management 
(SP)  (RP)  (P) 
vii) High dependability on NPOS 
functionality/benefits (DP 2) (SP)  (RP)  (P) 
POS Spatial/Physical System Attributes 
i)  Small and appropriate size/area 
(DP 2) Small/moderate (MP) 
Small/moderate 
(MP) (P) 
ii)  High predictability of production: 
Productivity (availability and 
recoverability based on its quality) 
(DP 2) 
(SP) (RP) (P) 
iii)  Low mobility (facilities and 
amenities) (DP 2) (MP) (SP) (P) 
iv)  Demarcability of boundary (DP 1, 
DP 7) (P) (P) (P) 
v)  Good location (accessibility, 
proximity, centrality) (DP 2) (SP) (SP) (P) 
vi)  Regular shape (flexibility) (DP 2) (SP) (SP) (P) 
vii) Club good features (DP 1, DP 7) With co-management (SP) (A) (P) 
Governance/Institution Attributes 
i)  Formal common property-
rights recognised by the 
government (DP 1, DP 7) 
With co-management 
(SP) (A) (P) 
ii)  Operational rules (e.g., 
monitoring, consumption, 
management and monitoring 
rules) (DP 3, DP 4) 
With co-management 
(SP) (A) (P) 
iii)  Collective-choice rules  
 (DP 3) 
With co-management 
(SP) (A) (P) 
iv)  Co-management by 
government  
 (DP 1, DP 4, DP 7) 
With co-management 
(SP) (A) (P) 
v)  Graduated sanction (DP 5) Penalty involves exclusion (RP) (A) (P) 
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IAD-based SES Attributes CL POS NT POS 
Successful Collective 
Action DPs  
(as a Standard) 
vi)  Conflict resolution 
 mechanism (DP 6) (RP) (A) (P) 
vii) Polycentricity (DP 8) With co-management (RP) (A) (P) 
Source: Adapted from Ling (2019) 
 
Finally, there is a conceptual contribution for the standardisation of the countermeasure. The 
developed and validated solution above not only confirms but also modifies and extends the 
theoretical knowledge basis, mainly taking the comprehensive integration of Ostrom’s (1990) 
eight common-property-regime-based-self-organising design principles for collective action, 
which includes property-rights, transaction costs, commons, social dilemmas theories and other 
scholars’ design principles, Nelson’s (2004) homeowner association concept, and Williamson’s 
theory of opportunism (Williamson, 1993) into account. This is not only consistent with the DSR 
framework’s assumption that a theory has to be used in designing the solution, but its 
amalgamation of various concepts and theories is also deemed desirable (see Venable, 2006 that 




Finding a suitable, valid model or design framework to step-by-step construct an urban planning 
solution, in particular addressing POS governance, management and consumption issues, is 
challenging as it has so far received little attention from both scholars and practitioners. 
Nevertheless, a revised DSR framework serving as a common methodological platform in the 
fields of management and information systems was adopted for developing and validating a 
conceptual solution in the planning field. This paper reported how the DSR methodology was 
applied in the context of a dynamic institutional-social POS system, in which the framework’s 
applicability was explored. We discussed how the revised three-step iterative, systematic 
framework using both theoretical knowledge and empirical data from the literature review was 
applied in identifying issues and root causes, constructing and validating a conceptual solution, 
and standardising the solution with an existing theory or concept.  
 
In summary, the following were the key findings found in each stage. Firstly, via the in-depth 
problem/issue analysis to distinguish symptoms and root causes, one can accurately define and 
understand the real underlying causes contributing to POS issues. In this case, POS governance 
and quality issues were due to the institutional factor. That is, the complex state-owned POS 
regime, leading to for example maladaptive rights, attenuated rights, de facto rights and 
incomplete rights, has triggered high transaction (enforcement) costs, which therefore externalise 
opportunistic and self-interested behaviours of POS users and managers to mismanage, 
underinvest in and overuse POSs. Secondly, based on the POS issues and root causes, a 
conceptual institutional solution of self-organising collective action was developed, advocating 
strong, secure communal rights, low enforcement costs and perverse incentives, more well-
defined exchange of rights and duties, and co-management. This is likely to be a valid, efficient 
and suitable alternative to address the POS governance issues. Thirdly, in the validation stage, the 
proposed conceptual solution drawing on different theories and concepts and possibly generating 
new knowledge was deemed institutionally and operationally feasible, especially for local CL 
POSs, with low adaptation or shifting costs from the state property regime to the common 
property regime.  
 






Therefore, there are three main observations of the current application of DSR, suggesting that: 
(i) the procedural framework is relevant and applicable in the urban planning (POS management) 
context; (ii) it is a flexible approach allowing multiple methods and theories to be used to reach 
the aim of this study; and (iii) adopting the DSR methodology in other social science and planning 
fields would be a productive research endeavour. Aside from making conceptual contribution and 
methodological innovation, there are policy implications. Not only does the developed artifact 
provide insight into the institutional causes resulting in POS governance issues to policymakers 
(e.g. land officers and local governments), it also offers potentials and the detailed institutional 
formation and operational guides of self-organising collective action to neighbourhood residents. 
The artifact offering successful institutional-social-ecological design principles helps to 
incentivise and stimulate active participation as well as new collaborative work practices in the 
community.  
 
Nevertheless, this study is not without limitations. The analysis results presented are limited to 
one state (i.e. two districts of Sabah) and can be strengthened and refined through similar 
institutional POS issues in other states or districts. The design and analysis of the current study 
were solely based on the available secondary sources. Additionally, the conceptually validated 
solution was based on a pilot study and has not been field-tested. Therefore, we suggest future 
studies to consider carrying out a more in-depth, holistic validation study and to test the 
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